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At Last, the End of the Tunnel
By John O. Bornhofen

As of early April, it is apparent that the
Great Recession of 1981-82 is finally
over, and the economy has embarked
on its long-awaited expansion. In a later
article, we will review the reasons why
the economy behaved as it did, why the
recession occurred, and why it went on
so long. In this article, we will look at
what happened during the last two years
and the likely outlook for 1983.

The Recession Just Ended
The recession probably ended last
December, after beginning in July, 1981.
This duration of one and a half, years
made it the longest since World War II,
although not the deepest.
The best measure of overall economic
activity is real Gross National Product,
which measures total production of all
final goods and services in the American
economy, after adjustment for inflation.
It fell at a seasonally adjusted annual rate
of 1.1 percent from the second quarter
of 1981 to the fourth quarter of 1982.
Accordingly, since the real output fell,
fewer workers were needed, and em
ployment fell while unemployment rose.
The number of people employed
dropped from almost 100.9 mUlion in
July, 1981, to 99.1 million in December,
1982. In that same period, the number
of unemployed rose from 7.8 million to
12 million. Accordingly, the unemploy
ment rate rose from 7.2 percent in July,
1981, to 10.7 percent in December,
1982. Both the number of the unem
ployed and the rate (unemployment as
a percentage of the labor force) were
postwar records.
The decline in total output was evi
dent from the decline in the utilization of
business productive capacity (plant and
equipment). The Federal Reserve's
measure of capacity utilization in manu
facturing dropped from almost 80 per
cent in mid-1981 to 67.5 percent in
December, a postwar low. This mirrored
the decline in industrial production of 12
percent during the recession.
The reduction in sales, production,
and capacity utilization are all mani
fested in the "bottom line" for business
profits. Corporate profits before taxes
and other adjustments plunged almost
23 percent between the third quarter of
1981 and the fourth quarter of 1982,
and the decline for big industrial com
panies such as those in the Dow-Jones

Industrial (stock) Average was even
greater.
The decline in production was not
across the board, however; it never is.
This time it was accounted for by notice
able declines in consumer purchases of
"big-ticket" items (until the end of 1982),
in business investment in plant and
equipment and inventories, and in ex
ports to foreign countries, and by a very
slight decline in state and local govern
ment purchases of goods and services,
all in real terms. The reduction in busi
ness inventories, always a factor in reces
sions, was especially sharp this time.
From the third quarter of 1981 to the
fourth quarter of 1982, inventories fell
by $30 billion. Personal consumption
expenditures by households on non
durable goods and services rose, as did
Federal Government expenditures on
goods and services.
The surprising part of Federal govern
ment spending on goods and services
(not transfer payments) is that, in spite of
President Reagan's efforts to get it under
control, it still rose, even after adjustment
for inflation. And, contrary to popular
belief, non-defense spending was rising
faster than defense spending! This at a
time when investment in our future pro
ductive capacity, which is necessary to
maintain and advance our standard of
living, was falling.
Not all the news was bad in the last
two years, however. The severe costs of
the recession (lost output to all and mis
ery to some) did bring a benefit
reduced inflation. By all measures, infla
tion was much less severe at the end of
the recession than at the beginning. The
inflation rate on the general (GNP) price
index fell from 9 percent in the third
quarter of 1981 to 3.7 percent in the
fourth quarter of 1982. The inflation in
producer's prices was also moderate.
That index rose only 3.8 percent during
the recession. Those facts notwithstand
ing, the progress against inflation was
most impressive on consumer prices. The
consumer price index, which was rising
at almost 15 percent annually in JUly,
1981, rose only 2.3 percent annually
during the second half of 1982. These
declines notwithstanding, however, in
flation has not ended. More on this later.
Personal income-the income of the
household sector-continued to grow in
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nominal terms despite the recession, •
creaSing at a 6.6 percent rate. All sources
of personal income continued to grow
although at reduced rates from the past,
except for the rental income of house
holds, which actually declined. The
sources rising the fastest were transfer
payments, followed by interest income,
dividends, fringe benefits for labor, wages
and salaries, and the income of proprie
tors, in that order. Transfer payments
increased over 19 percent from mid
1981 to December, 1982, because of
the rise in joblessness due to the reces
sion and in spite of President Reagan's
well-publicized attempts to curb social
spending at the Federal level.
As would be expected, interest rates
dropped sharply during the recession.
Treasury bUi rates went from 15-16 per
cent in mid-1981 to 8 percent in Decem
ber, 1982, and AAA corporate bonds fell
from over 15 percent to below 12 per
cent in the same period. The prime rate
at banks also declined, from over 20 per
cent to 11 percent.
Prices of common stock declined d~
ing the recession, until August, 19~
Then they jumped, in one of the most
spectacular surges on record. For exam
ple, the New York Stock Exchange com
posite index of stock prices fell 18 per
cent from June, 1981, to July, 1982, but
then rose at an astounding annual rate of
64 percent from July to December, 1982.

The First Part of 1983
The first quarter of 1983 showed the
first sustained evidence of economic ex
panSion since early 1981. If the whole
year continues as it began-and it is ex
pected to-it will be a year of improve
ment. Real GNP rose at a 3. 1 percent
seasonally adjusted annual rate in the
most recent quarter. Reflecting this in
crease, industrial production and capital
utilization also grew and, spurred on by
lower interest rates, the rise in housing
starts continued to accelerate. Although
employment remained unchanged, the
civilian unemployment rate edged down
to 10. 1 percent in March.
Inflation continued to abate in the first
quarter. While the GNP deflator index
rose faster than in the previous quart
the CPI and Producer's Price index w
flat. They indicate that inflation has bee
throttled, but only temporarily.
continued on page 5

a

At Last, the End of the Tunnel

All of these results are consistent with
Wfset of Federal government policies that
have been expansionary for at least nine
months. Federal fiscal policy is still stim
ulative in that the deficit that would be
expected if the economy were operating
at a high-employment level is very large.
According to the Government's own es
timates, the Federal budget would have
a deficit of $40+ billion in 1983 even
if the economy were operating at a
high level of output and employment,
rather than just rising from a cyclically
depressed level. Other estimates of the
high-employment deficit are even higher.
As things are, the Federal deficit is
expected to be around $200 billion this
year. Since Federal spending is adding
more to aggregate demand for goods
and services than Federal taxes are tak
ing out, the Federal budget is stimulative
in the direct sense. However, the deficit
must be financed, and that financing is
keeping interest rates high. High interest
rates hold down private demand for
goods and services, because they repre
sent the cost of borrowing and the return
from lending instead of spending. These
~direct effects offset some of the direct
':::ffects of the Federal fiscal stimulus. This
is "crowding-out," and, unfortunately, it
will get even worse as economic activity
picks up and private credit demands rise.
The Federal Reserve's monetary pol
icy has also been expansionary since
mid-1982. All of the monetary aggre
gates, such as Ml (the stock of money in
currency and transactions-type bal
ances), total reserves, the monetary base
(total reserves and currency), and M2
(the more broadly-defined stock of
money), have been rising rapidly. Ml has
risen at a seasonally adjusted annual rate
of over 15 percent since September. It
has been fueled by an 11 + percent in
crease in the monetary base and a 14+
percent rise in total reserves since Sep
tember. And since the first of the year,
this growth has accelerated.
While there is presently much idle ca
pacity and unemployment in the econ
omy to absorb the additional demand
that monetary expansion can bring
about, it would be easy for the Federal
Reserve to go too far in this regard. Ex
cessive monetary growth of the magniAude we have been seeing of late has
~ypically been associated with high and
accelerating rates of inflation in subse
quent periods. Indeed, the stubbornly
high level of interest rates we see in the

financial markets is consistent with the
view that those markets expect inflation
to bottom out soon and to speed up in
the future.
Rapid outbursts of monetary growth
for relatively short periods of time, such
as we are now witnessing, are no substi
tute for a steady, moderate growth of
money, period after period, to the extent
that that is achievable. The recent strong
rise in M2 , total reserves, and the mone
tary base indicate that there is more going
on than just funds being shifted out of
checking and saving deposits and money
market funds and into the new "Super
NOW" and "Money Market Deposit Ac
counts" at banks and thrift institutions.
The growth of the monetary aggregates
has been excessive and must be brought
under control before it really has an im
pact on total demand and expectations
of future inflation. The major danger to
the recovery is the possibility that the
Fed will continue to inflate the money
stock at excessive rates and then slam on
the brakes as they have done so often in
the past. It is assumed here that the Fed
has learned from its past mistakes and
will not repeat them at this juncture.

The Outlook for the Rest of 1983
It is antiCipated that the growth in the
first three months will continue through
out 1983 but at a slightly faster rate. This
is supported by a number of factors such
as the stimulative monetary and fiscal
policies cited above, rising leading indi
cators, rising housing starts, improving
measures of consumer confidence, and
surveys of corporate purchasing agents
that indicate that production and orders
are up and that inventories are very lean.
Other positive factors are the recent de
clines in oil prices and the orderly way in
which the debt of Third-World and East
ern bloc countries is being rescheduled
by commercial banks.
For the rest of 1983, the expansion
will be unbalanced, as most are at this
stage. Consumption spending by the
household sector, including spending on
durables, will lead the way. While this
will include an increase in the demand
for new cars, domestic auto production
is expected to increase less rapidly than
in previous expansions, because of high
new-car prices, stiff foreign competition,
and a changed role for automobiles.
Nevertheless, car production and sales
should improve as incomes pick up, and
Michigan should experience noticeable
improvement.
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Other sectors of demand will be
mixed. Housing construction should be
strong reflecting the sizeable decline in
mortgage interest rates in recent months.
Government purchases of goods and
services in the market will increase (in
real terms) and help buttress consumer
spending. Business spending for inven
tories should increase modestly as the
expansion unfolds, but expenditures on
fixed plant and equipment will lag be
hind the rest of the economy at least until
the second half. This reflects the abun
dance of unused plants and equipment
along with the business sector's severe
cash flow problems over the last 18
months. High real interest rates are keep
ing many projects from being profitable
and are still holding down investment.
Our net export position should con
tinue to weaken in the coming months
because of several factors. Among these
are the strong dollar in the foreign ex
change markets which is keeping foreign
imports cheap and making U.S. exports
to the rest of the world expensive. Also,
the recovery in incomes in the U.S. will
induce people to buy more goods from
abroad, thus increasing our imports. In
addition, the recession in much of the
rest of the world and the lack of buying
power on the part of the less-developed
countries will also hold down demand
for American goods. All told, net exports
(exports minus imports) should continue
to weaken and hold down the growth of
domestic demand.
All in all, we are looking for about a 4
percent growth in real GNP for the cal
endar year 1983. Employment will rise
as the economy picks up, but trend
growth in the labor force along with a
cyclical return of "discouraged" workers
will keep unemployment high. The un
employment rate should average 9.5 to
10 percent for the year. Inflation should
continue to be moderate, averaging 3 to
5 percent depending on the price index.
Modest expansion of demand along with
favorable price performances by food
and petroleum will also insure no real
resurgence of inflation this year.
In short, 1983 looks even more like it
will be a fairly good year, and 1984 looks
good also.
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